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Labour migration, capitalist accumulation and feudal reproduction: A 
historical analysis from the Eastern Gangetic Plains 
 
Fraser Sugden 
 
Abstract 
This paper engages with the long running debate on the transition from farm based livelihoods to 
capitalism. Tracing the historic evolution of modes of production in the peripheral Mithilanchal region the 
Eastern Gangetic Plains, it notes how the economic processes driving the peasantry into the labour force 
are not directly connected to the process of capitalist accumulation in the diverse locales where labour is 
employed, as one may observe under classic situations of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. The entry of 
the peasantry into the surplus labour pool is instead linked with a complex convergence of internal 
changes within the feudal mode of production on an economic, cultural and political level, and its 
interaction with expanding capitalist markets. The paper does note however that migrant labour still 
generates substantial profits for capitalism with a sharing of surplus between the latter and landlord-
money lenders. It argues however that the relationship between modes of production is neither functional 
nor coincidental, and the paper sheds light on some of the larger class alliances which have evolved in the 
current political-economic conjuncture. 
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Introduction 
The movement of peasants from land based livelihoods to capitalist labour markets at home or overseas 
is one of the most significant social transformations underway in rural parts of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, and this is represented most prominently by large scale labour migration. Structural adjustment, 
enclosure of common property resources and environmental stress have precipitated this transformation. 
This process is often conflated with Marx’s ‘primitive accumulation’. However, a review of contemporary 
critical scholarship on the topic can easily lead one to believe that capitalism is an all-embracing force 
which is both dissolving older economic formations, while simultaneously driving the migration of 
peasants away from land to the labour reserve army. Based upon a case study from the Mithilanchal 
region in the Gangetic Plains of Nepal and India, this paper highlights the need to better understand to 
complex interface between the capitalist and pre-capitalist when analysing the movement of the 
peasantry into capitalist labour markets.  It notes how ‘feudal’ agrarian formations in this labour sending 
region, far from being static relics, are actively reproduced (albeit in new forms), alongside capitalist 
accumulation in the regions which receive the labour – a process that is however, mediated by a matrix 
of economic, political, ecological and cultural changes. 
This paper notes as has been done elsewhere (Li, 2010, Read, 2002) that there is a disconnect between 
the processes driving the expansion of a ‘reserve army’ of migrant workers and the processes of global 
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capitalism which profit through employing this labour. This paper however, takes the analysis a step 
further to firstly emphasise that migrant labour (which forms the backbone of capitalist industry in the 
cities of the global periphery) does not originate in a rural vacuum. It instead emerges from communities 
with complex histories of uneven integration into capitalist markets and a matrix of pre-existing modes of 
production, which are interacting with capitalism in increasingly complex ways and mediating the flow of 
migrant labour on an economic and non-economic level. Unlike past work on the ‘articulation’ of modes 
of production, what is unique in Mithilanchal is the sharing of surplus between capitalist sector and a 
feudal landlord-money lending class. This is reproduced at a national or regional level through a loose yet 
evolving convergence of class interests and alliances across the larger social formations of Nepal and India.  
On an epistemological level, a the paper reaffirms the continued utility of the Althusserian 
conceptualisation of the articulation of modes of production, to understanding complex social formations 
home to both capitalist and pre-capitalist formations. This includes the frameworks set out in the radical 
anthropology of the 70s and 80s, which have received limited interest in recent decades in spite of their 
methodological sophistication (see also Cross and Cliffe, 2017). 
Theorising proleterianisation and pre-capitalist modes of production 
‘Proletarianisation’ in the global periphery  
In today’s global periphery, the large scale movement of peasants from the land to capitalist labour 
markets is frequently considered in the critical geography and agrarian change literature to be intricately 
connected to the processes of capitalist globalization.  The drive by capital to avert crises requires 
differentiation by ‘extra-economic’ means (Akram-Lodhi, 2007, Araghi, 2012a). In the contemporary 
periphery for example, this is characterized by the appropriation of land for capitalist investment and the 
privatization of common property resources, often with the support of foreign capital1, a process 
commonly termed ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003). The degree to which ‘coercion’ is 
necessary has been debated, and proletarianisation via market forces alone is also relevant, particularly 
when observing the policies of neo-liberal restructuring (Hall, 2012). Cuts in subsidies and price supports, 
the commodification of seeds, dependence on chemical or hydrocarbon based inputs, and export oriented 
production can all serve to intensify peasant differentiation (Akram-Lodhi, 2007, 2008, Araghi, 2012a, 
Bernstein, 2003).   
Much scholarship acknowledges that contemporary proletarianisation is releasing a global ‘reserve army’ 
of migrant labour, engaged in increasingly insecure low wage employment (Bernstein, 2004, Walker, 2008, 
Araghi, 2003). This is functional to capital as it seeks a ‘spatial fix’ to avert the crisis associated with falling 
rates of profit (Harvey, 2001). Araghi (2012) for example, observes a de-ruralisation and emergent ‘camps’ 
of surplus labour who have migrated to cities, dispossessed of their land due to economic shocks or 
enclosure. Such migrants are often on casual contracts, lack access to basic workers’ rights, and receive 
below subsistence wages, often in so called Special Economic Zones (Arnold and Pickles, 2011).  
There is however, recognition that capitalist globalisation is not a ‘monolithic’ force (Hart, 2002). Hall 
(2013) for example, engages critically with the literature on accumulation by dispossession and ‘land 
grabs’, problematizing assumptions which place these as part of a linear model of capitalist development. 
                                                          
1 This does not only involve the creation of capitalist labour relations, but other processes involving the 
redistribution of assets to facilitate accumulation, including for example corporate mergers and acquisitions (Hall, 
2012). However, it is the former process which is of interest to this paper. 
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Similarly, Li (2010), while not contesting the very real processes of dispossession underway in the global 
periphery, warns against assuming a functional relationship between the process of neo-liberal capitalist 
expansion which causes dispossession, and the processes through which the resultant ‘surplus’ labour is 
mobilised. In other words, capital does not always dispossess specifically to access labour, a point also 
echoed by Hall (2013). Examples include plantations, which displace peasants yet do not absorb this 
surplus labour pool as they either bring in labour from outside, or generate profit by using labour saving 
technologies. Also cited are the creation of Special Economic Zones which cause dispossession yet depend 
on non-labour intensive sectors such as information technology (Li, 2010). What instead is realized, is the 
release of a dispossessed and even ‘pauperized’ population which is surplus to the requirements of capital 
(Li, 2010). In a similar vein, Webber (2008b), with reference to China, points to a broader set of processes 
driving communities’ separation from the means of production aside from the drive for capitalist 
accumulation. These include political or cultural-ideological processes, which are not reducible to 
economic logic alone. 
Accumulation without dispossession  
The disconnect discussed thus far highlights that capitalist globalisation is a selective and multifaceted 
process, with more than one set of class interests at play. In a similar vein, it is increasingly evident that 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ itself is just one of many processes of capitalist class formation in the 
global periphery.  Household units of production can be functionally articulated to supply surplus to 
capitalism without losing land, usually through petty commodity production (Banaji, 1977, Bernstein, 
1977, De Janvry, 1981)2. Araghi (2012b) refers to this as ‘partial’ dispossession where surplus is 
appropriated by corporate capital via the sub-contractors who supply inputs at unfavourable rates. Also 
relevant is the concept of ‘semi-proletarians’ whereby peasant producers maintain enough land to 
‘subsidise’ capitalist labour (Bernstein, 2001). This tendency was outlined by both Lenin (1960) and 
Kautsky (1988), and referred to in the Latin American context as ‘functional dualism’ (De Janvry, 1981). 
The presence of a non-proletarianised labour force that can periodically supply workers has been framed 
by Glassman (2006) as evidence that ‘primitive accumulation’ is not a one off event but a continuous 
feature of capitalism. 
Hart (2002b) specifically coins the term ‘accumulation without dispossession’ to explain the unique 
pattern of capitalist accumulation in China and Taiwan whereby smallholder farming facilitates the  
reproduction of capitalist labour. Paudel (2016) also uses  the term with reference to the community 
forestry sector in Nepal.  Direct producers harvest forest products from community owned forests via a 
network of contractors and community elites, facilitating capital accumulation without the enclosure of 
forest lands.  
This rich body of scholarship accepts that capitalism and even ‘primitive accumulation’ can exist without 
full proletarianisation of labour. What is important is not the concentration of the means of production 
or ‘dispossession’ but the subordination of producers to market imperatives of capitalism (Hall, 2012). 
While this scholarship goes a considerable way to deconstruct linear narratives of capitalist transition, 
there is often an implication that producers who are not dispossessed are, nevertheless, still an integral 
part of capitalism, rather than being integrated into a mode of production in its own right.  Hall (2012) 
cautions that in order to understand primitive accumulation, it is necessary to conceptualise what is inside 
                                                          
2 This process is epitomized by contract farming (White, 1997) 
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capitalism and what is outside. Social relations may be ‘outside’ the sphere of capitalist production, even 
if they are situated within larger a capitalist economy.  
Sanyal (2014), for example, suggests that contemporary human rights discourse and welfarist 
governmentality are allowing for a reversal of primitive accumulation, and are producing spaces which 
allow for the recreation of ‘non-capitalist’ economic formations, what he terms the ‘need economy’. This 
is framed as an imperative of governance and the global development industry to ensure the sustenance 
of those who are surplus to the requirements of capitalism, while in the process, maintaining the 
hegemony of capital. However, the concept of reversal implies that primitive accumulation has already 
taken place, and thus the concept of ‘pre-capitalist’ modes of production lacks relevance, a position which 
this paper departs from.  
Understanding the ‘pre-capitalist’: Lessons from Althusser 
Some of the most nuanced analyses of non-capitalist formations have been through the Althusserian 
tradition, which sought to reformulate Marxian political economy to counter critiques of economism and 
essentialism (Resch, 1992). A key entry point for this research is the conceptualisation of the mode of 
production itself. To Althusser and Balibar (1968, 215), the mode of production is constituted by three 
functional ‘elements’, the means of production, the labourer, and the appropriator of surplus labour.  
These three elements are structured by two ‘connections’: the relation between the labourer and the 
means of production (the forces of production), and the property relation which defines the how surplus 
is appropriated and put to use (the relations of production) (Althusser and Balibar, 1968, 212-216).  
Crucially, Althusser and Balibar note that modes of production never exist in isolation, but coexist and 
articulate with others at specific historical junctures. An important theoretical tool to support this is that 
of the ‘‘social formation,” conceptualised as a matrix of ‘instances’ which can be economic, ideological or 
political and are structurally connected with varying levels of functionality or autonomy. On an economic 
level, there may be several coexisting modes of production, although one is normally ‘dominant’, and this 
can be either capitalist or pre-capitalist (Althusser and Balibar, 1968, 212-215). A social formation has 
been conceptualised as a structural equivalent to the sociological concept of ‘society’ (Tilley, 1982), 
although what this means in terms of spatial configurations is less clear. To Santos and Slaner (1977, 5), it 
is space which gives a social formation its concrete form through the localised convergence of not just 
economic (i.e. modes of production themselves), but political and ideological processes. As they note: 
“The history of the social formation is the history of the superimposition of forms created by the succession 
of modes of production, of their entanglement with its ‘spatial territory’ ”.  Bettelheim (1972) argues that 
there is a complex hierarchy of ‘national’ social formations, in which capitalist or pre-capitalist systems 
may be dominant, although all are situated within a broader “worldwide capitalist mode of production”. 
Social formations can also be conceptualised at a subnational level when political-ideological or economic 
forms are localised within a larger national social formation. They may also take the form of larger cross 
border cultural regions (see Frankenberg, 1978, Seddon, 1978).  
The debate over social formations is of important theoretical relevance to this paper, as even if a national 
(or regional) social formation is dominated by capitalism, this does not mean that modes of production 
on the ground are ‘capitalist’, an assumption too often made in agrarian transition scholarship. Andre 
Gunder Frank for example, argued that peripheral economies such as India and Latin America were 
‘capitalist’ since the colonial era due to their integration within (and supply of surplus to) the global 
economy through mercantile capitalism. However, this conceptualization has been critiqued for over-
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emphasizing the relations of exchange (and merchant capital) rather than the relations of production 
(Hall, 1996). Such an ahistorical approach marks a departure from Marx himself, who acknowledged the 
importance of pre-capitalist modes of production in mediating capitalist infiltration into peripheral locales 
such as colonial India (Gupta, 1977, Lin, 1980)3.   
However, the Althusserian tradition extends beyond simply acknowledging the presence of coexisting 
modes of production. The processes through which the capitalist and non-capitalist interact can be better 
understood through the concept of ‘overdetermination’ which refers to the multifarious means through 
which various processes in the social whole are constituted by each other (Althusser, 1969). Althusser 
(1969, 106) stresses that a given contradiction (e.g. between labour and capital), can be understood only 
by reference to its relation to the multiple forms of the superstructure within a given social formation 
(e.g. the state, ideology), and its embeddedness within specific local historical contexts on the one hand 
(e.g. local culture, patterns of class struggle, trajectories of internal economic change) and within a 
particular “world context” on the other (i.e. unique relations of domination and subordination between 
nations). To Althusser however, the superstructure is not a necessary condition of the base, but has its 
own essence and logic (Althusser, 1969).  This has parallels with recent literature asserting how locally 
confined political processes of the state which are not driven directly by a logic of capital accumulation, 
can play a critical role in mediating the dispossession of the peasantry by capitalism  (Hall, 2012, Webber, 
2008a), resulting in far more complex and drawn out interactions with capitalism.     
The French radical anthropologists of the 1970s and 80s represented an important body of scholarship 
influenced by the Althusserian tradition. Mobilising ethnographic research in Sub-Saharan Africa, they 
sought to understand the co-existence of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production and the 
associated interaction between economic, political and ideological processes (Dupré and Rey, 1979, 
Meillassoux, 1973, 1980). For example, Dupré and Rey, (1979) with regards to Congo-Brazzaville noted 
how the pre-colonial lineage mode of production purchased goods from capitalism, yet the primacy of 
exchange relations within the clan for symbolic rather than productive purposes meant there was little 
interest in accumulation. This was in fact an obstacle for capitalism in its drive to yield surplus value in the 
form of labour or commodities.  Rey notes that only the coercive political and economic interventions of 
colonialism were able to subordinate such modes of production (cf. Resch, 1992). 
The most important contributions of this body of scholarship was the analysis of how these older modes 
of production could ‘resist’ capitalist expansion, but could also be reconfigured so they could supply 
surplus to the latter. Paradoxically, these articulations – once well established – could be very profitable 
for capitalism. Hall (2012) and Glassman (2006) cites this as one of the reasons that state bureaucracies 
or capitalists may even oppose primitive accumulation. An important argument in this regards revolves 
around the concept of labour reproduction. Marx (2008 [1933], 36),  notes that wages in capitalism cover 
both the cost of the maintenance of the labourer and the cost of reproducing the labour force. As he 
notes: “In the same manner, the cost of production of simple labor-power must include the cost of 
propagation, by means of which the race of workers is enabled to multiply itself, and to replace worn-out 
                                                          
3 Whether one gives primacy to the relations of exchange or the relations of production when characterising 
modes of production and their transition represents a deeper fissure in Marxist political economy. This was echoed 
in the debate over the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe with Sweezy focussing his analysis on 
trade and exchange, while Dobb and others (e.g. Takahashi and Mins, 1952) gave primacy to the production 
relations on the ground. 
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workers with new ones”. However, in the context of the kind of temporary migrant labour which is 
widespread in peripheral social formations, the wages only cover the cost of the labourer alone, offering 
exceptional profits to capitalist employers, a point elaborated in detail by Meillassoux (1981, 107-137) in 
the context of West Africa.  
Meillassoux noted how during Europe’s industrialization, the destruction of the peasantry culminated in 
a stable proletariat whose labour power was produced, maintained and reproduced within capitalism 
itself. In the case of peripheral economies however, this often falls to the domestic agricultural economy 
to compensate for lower wages, as most migrants do not make a ‘break’ from the land. They increasingly 
migrate often as individual workers without their families, and maintain strong ties to their home 
community, where they return periodically and on retirement. In this context, migrants (and also casual 
non-migrant labourers) are paid a wage which covers only their minimum subsistence needs.  It often falls 
to the pre-capitalist mode of production in their place of origin, to cover the living cost of the migrant 
during periods spent at home, or when they are unproductive due to illness. The pre-capitalist sector also 
covers the longer term costs of both bringing up and educating children who often stay at home (i.e. 
creating the new generation of workers), and their ‘retirement’, including networks of social support.  
These are costs which in advanced capitalism may be borne by higher wages or the welfare state, a point 
noted by Sehgal (2005) and Breman (2009). In peripheral countries however, they are provided by the 
pre-capitalist sector as a ‘rent’ for capitalism (Meillassoux, 1981). Wolpe (1979) made a similar argument 
with regards to the Apartheid era black reserve whereby the kinship based units of production in the 
reserves met the reproduction needs of labour power for capitalism, with this articulation being 
reproduced through the political apparatus of the state and its racial ideologies.  
Under neo-liberal globalization, Sehgal (2005) notes that the increased importance of temporary 
migration to livelihoods in the Global South, mean the dependence upon domestic and community 
economic and cultural systems to reproduce labour power is becoming even more important. This can be 
set against a broader context outlined by Nancy Fraser (2018) whereby capitalism under neoliberalism is 
increasingly dependent upon labour in the periphery, whereby colonialism and racialized ideology 
obstructed the development of class compromise and legal frameworks which in later years operated in 
the interests of workers in the core. This included (amongst others) covering labour reproduction costs 
through higher wages and welfare.  
Althusser’s approach to articulation has of course been developed but also critiqued, most notably the 
post-structuralist Marxian tradition (Gibson-Graham et al., 2001) which has sought to move beyond 
notions of a hierarchy of modes of production subordinate to capitalism. Instead it further develops 
Althusser’s concept of ‘overdetermination’ to represent the economy as constituting a decentered totality 
of ‘‘multiple capitalisms” and “non-capitalist” formations (Gibson-Graham, 1996, 23). While this work 
deconstructs the vision of an all-powerful capitalism, it also argues that no process in the social world 
(economic, political or ideological) and no particular economic formation (capitalist or otherwise) can be 
considered more important than any other in determining a particular outcome. While the move to 
identify complexity in economic formations is useful, Glassman (2003) stresses the need to maintain a 
notion of structural power to explain phenomena such as uneven development or to identify the 
dominant contradiction against which political struggles can be directed. He therefore places value in 
recognising the casual efficacy of particular structural forces (such as particular class contradictions or 
processes), yet emphasises, like Althusser, that these are present in particular historical-empirical 
conjunctures, rather than being embedded in a priori theory (Glassman, 2003).   
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This argument echoes the much earlier intervention by Stuart Hall, who defends the Althusserian position 
in the face of post-structural critique, for its capacity to understand the unity within complexity: “…we 
have to characterize Althusser's advance, not in terms of his insistence on "difference" alone-the rallying 
cry of Derridean deconstruction-but instead in terms of the necessity of thinking unity and difference; 
difference in complex unity, without this becoming a hostage to the privileging of difference as such” 
(1985, 93). Hall (1996) also asserts the intrinsic value of the concept of articulation of modes of production 
to understand the ‘complex unity’ of social formations, including the African cases analysed by scholars 
such as Wolpe and Meillassoux. However, in his analysis of South Africa he usefully substitutes the 
Althusserian notion of ideology with Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to understand the means through 
which the ideological and political levels of social formations interact with the economic4. Hegemony is 
defined as a system through which a dominant class achieves social authority, often through non-coercive 
means, on an economic, political and ideological level – in this case, through the prism of race.  
Feudalism and articulation of modes of production in South Asia 
One of the most well-known engagement with ‘non-capitalist’ economic formations in South Asia was the 
Mode of Production debate in the 1970s and 80s which sought to determine whether Indian agriculture 
capitalist (see Rudra, 1974) or ‘semi-feudal’ (see Bhaduri, 1973, 1977, Prasad, 1973). Bhaduri  (1973) 
presented a classic model of semi-feudalism in rural Bengal whereby land poor peasants are bonded to 
landlords through the interlinkage of land ownership and usury. Innovations to increase yields are 
withheld by landlords as this will reduce the tenants’ indebtedness and undermine the power and 
authority of the landlords, even if the surplus they can extract is higher. In an associated argument, the 
concept of a ‘semi-colonial’ social formation suggests that as the capitalist sector has been distorted by 
imperialism, it does not have the capacity to end the rural poor’s dependence on landlords, and ‘semi-
feudalism’ thus survives in rural areas (Chandra, 1974, Sau, 1975). 
While these observations were important, unlike the Althusserian influenced research from Africa, they 
remained largely economistic in their explanations. As a consequence the concept of semi-feudalism was 
easily critiqued. Brass (2002) problematizes the concept over its weak conceptual definition and linear 
conceptualisation of history whereby semi-feudalism is defined by the presence of unfree agrarian 
relationships alone. They are interpreted as relics of the past, when in fact such relationships are 
widespread under capitalism. He also critiques the very term ‘semi-’ which suggests an ambiguity in 
systems which are in fact defined clearly in Marxism. Hart (1986) critiques the research on interlinked 
contracts, including the work of Bhaduri, given that conditions of un-freedom can appear in the context 
of productive reinvestment as well as apparently ‘backward’ agrarian contexts. They can be viewed 
instead as a means through which dominant groups exercise social control, rather than being emblematic 
of feudalism or a transitional stage in the development of agrarian capitalism. 
While this paper would still assert the utility of concepts such as feudal or semi-feudal modes of 
production in South Asia, it acknowledges that much past scholarship has failed to adequately define 
                                                          
4 This expands upon Althusser’s notion of ideology which placed considerable emphasis on the role of the state. 
The concept of hegemony captures how ideology is reproduced through civil society, outside of the direct control 
by state apparatus (Hall, 1985). 
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feudal agrarian relations, or engage with the complexities of how surplus was transferred between pre-
capitalist economic formations in the region, and the political, cultural and ideological processes through 
which articulations are reproduced. An exception was a much later study by Singh (2007), who applied 
the Althusserian concept of articulation to Adivasi or ‘tribal’ social formations in Madhya Pradesh 
supplying labour to capitalism, where there were some parallels with the communitarian African tribal 
societies discussed by Meillassoux. The study analyses the internal changes in relations of production and 
its relationship with feudal, and then capitalist modes of production, drawing links with the process of 
religious proselytization.  
With regards to Nepal, Blaikie et al’s (2001) study, while not mobilising the same theoretical framework, 
have offered a more nuanced analysis of the overall social formation, including the coexistence of 
capitalist and feudal modes of production, and the important role of the state and political apparatus in 
the context of Nepal’s structural dependence on India, as well as its complex position (i.e. a periphery 
within a periphery) in the global capitalist system. 
More recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in ‘modes of production’ in India, particularly in 
the context of the stresses brought about by neo-liberal restructuring (see edited volume,  Lerche et al., 
2013). While some research has continued to explore the persistence of semi-feudal modes of production 
(Kar, 2018), most scholarship has pointed to a decline in pre-capitalist social relations under expanding 
neo-liberal markets and migration (Harriss, 2013, Basu and Das, 2013, Rodgers and Rodgers, 2001). 
Scholars such as Patnaik (2006)  have, like Bernstein (2006) moved away entirely from the traditional 
‘agrarian question’. It has been argued that commercialisation and market liberalisation in India have left 
farmers vulnerable to falling prices and exploitation by global agribusiness (Patnaik, 2006). While the 
renewed interest in agrarian transition in South Asia is welcome, recent work has a tendency to imply that 
there is a nascent capitalism in agriculture (even if it has been blocked by imperialism), and downplay the 
persistence of the pre-capitalist.    
This paper does not claim that empirical research on the dissolution of older economic formations by 
capitalism is incorrect, either from South Asia or beyond. This transformation does apply in certain 
regions. The paper instead mobilises an Althusserian framework to trace a more complex process of 
transition in a particular geographical and temporal context – that of Mithilanchal. This is in tune with the 
most crucial epistemological break of the Althusserian tradition – the need to identify historical 
individualities of given social formations rather than attempting to fit what is observed into an 
evolutionary framework drawn from a priori theory5. The paper is thus strongly influenced by the French 
radical anthropological tradition, the utility of which has been overlooked in recent decades, in spite of 
its potential to shed light on the unprecedented changes in rural communities of the Global South since 
the 1990s (Cross and Cliffe, 2017). The approach combines ethnographic and historically grounded insight 
to uncover unique trajectories of economic change, without losing site of the structural processes which 
tie modes of production together and mediate the interaction between economic, political and cultural 
changes in a global context which has transformed rapidly since these early debates took root. 
                                                          
5 See the intervention by Bois (1978) in the debate with Brenner over the divergent paths of French and English 
feudalism.  
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Methods 
This research was focused on two districts in ‘Mithilanchal’, a densely populated region which spans the 
Nepal-India border, encompassing Northeast Bihar and parts of the Eastern Nepal Tarai-Madhesh. While 
the research is split across two districts (Dhanusha and Madhubani) on adjacent sides of the border, the 
region shares a common language and culture, and remarkable similarities in social structure and 
historical agrarian relations – making a two country study particularly valuable. The region is one of the 
most peripheral within both Nepal and Bihar respectively and thus an analyses into the root causes of 
persisting poverty in this belt are all the more valuable. 
The research involved in depth analysis of secondary sources including Nepal government and colonial 
sources, combined with data from multiple projects following 5 years of research in Mithilanchal. 
Statistical data was drawn from three large surveys on agriculture and livelihoods across ten villages (see 
Figure 1). The first random survey of was carried out in 2013 in Rakuwari and Bhupatti of Bihar’s 
Madhubani district, Thadi Jijha and Ekrahi of Nepal’s Dhanusha district (see Table 1). The second random 
survey was completed in 2014 in Ragunathpur and Giddha of Dhanusha, Korahiya and Nanour of 
Madhubani. The third is a census survey compiled from two villages in Madhubani, Bhagwatipur and 
Mahuyahi in 2015, which collected data on all households in the community. All three surveys were 
supplemented with qualitative interviews and focus groups (see Table 1), which included the collection of 
oral histories on agrarian relations. The largest data set is from 86 in depth interviews with women farmers 
carried out in Rakuwari of Madhubani and Thadi Jijha of Dhanusha in 2014, covering topics relating to the 
impact of out-migration on farm management, and the use of remittances, and including both focussed 
quantitative data and qualitative data6.  
Case study 
The historical origins of feudal agrarian relations in Mithilanchal: 1600s – 1950s  
Mithilanchal has a long history as a region, being once part of the ancient kingdom of Mithila, historically 
associated with the Hindu epic, the Ramayana (Burghart, 1978). Subsequent recorded histories points to 
an expansion and contraction of successive centralized kingdoms over the centuries centered on this 
northeastern corner of the Gangetic Plains. In some respects, Mithilanchal itself could be considered a 
‘social formation’ in its own right in the Althusserian sense. However, its division into two halves 
corresponding with the present day Nepal-India border under the Karnata dynasty in the 12th century 
(Chaudhury, 1964) and the important role played by the state in shaping the trajectory of change, points 
to the need for a more complex conceptualisation. This is because the region was from then onwards was 
gradually integrated into the two larger ‘national’ (albeit closely interacting) social formations of Nepal 
and India.   
Darbhanga on the Indian side, was subordinated to the Mughals in the 13th century. Hindu rajas and 
chieftains continued to retain economic and political privileges on payment of tribute, the most notable 
of which was the Darbhanga Raj an upper caste Hindu family appointed in the 16th century to maintain 
law and order and collect revenue (Chaudhury, 1964). The Nepal side of the border was known to have 
been reforested following the collapse of ancient Mithila, and aside from some small Hindu and tribal 
                                                          
6 Respondents were introduced to the team by the gatekeepers and invited to participate, although further 
participants were engaged through a ‘snowballing’ technique, whereby initial households we interviewed would in 
turn introduce us to other potential respondents. 
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chieftaincies, the Dhanusha region was only extensively resettled from the 17th century with the 
emergence of early state formations such as the Sen Kingdom (Burghart, 1978). This was followed by the 
Gorkhali dynasty, the founders of the present day Nepali state in the late 18th century, the expansion of 
which culminated in the clearing of the forest frontier (Gaige, 1976, Sugden, 2013). 
At the dawn of the colonial era, the mode of production on both sides of the border could be considered 
‘feudal’ in character. In order to understand what one means by ‘feudal’, it is necessary to move beyond 
simplistic definitions such as the presence of serfdom or forced labour, and identify a broader 
characterisation rooted in the mechanisms of exploitation, the property relationship and the form of 
labour power (see Takahashi and Mins, 1952).  The features of feudalism as alluded to by Marx (1932) 
when discussing the European context, include firstly, control over the means of production by a small 
land owning class with economic, as well as political-ideological power over a peasant majority. A second 
attribute includes the appropriation of surplus (often in kind) through extra-economic means, backed up 
by the political power of landlords - ‘surplus’ may take the form of labour tax or ground rent.  R S Sharma’s 
(1985) definition of ‘Indian feudalism’, refers to a similar agrarian system whereby the peasantry is 
subjugated to overlords who use extra-economic power to maintain control over land and appropriate 
surplus, either through rent, labour service or centralised taxation.  A third characteristic which is often 
overlooked is the use of surplus for consumption rather than productive reinvestment. Marx asserts that 
the feudal lord consumes the product of the land rather than investing it as capital to maximise 
productivity.  Even if the surplus is sold, generating ‘value’, it is used for “luxury consumption”, as Marx 
notes in Grundrisse (1973, 469).  
On the Indian side of the border in Madhubani, the revenue generation hierarchy of pre-Mughal Hindu 
state formations and a rigid caste structure, suggests that concentration of land amongst a landlord class 
was already present prior to the 13th century (Chaudhury, 1964). However, this was likely to have been 
solidified under the Mughals and Darbhanga Raj. As in other parts of the Mughal empire, politically 
powerful land owners, extracted a portion of the crop from the peasants to channel to the state as tax, 
retaining a portion for themselves for diversion into luxury consumption, while also extracting surplus as 
rent from tenants on their private holdings (Chaudhury, 1964). There was continuity in social relations 
when the region fell into British hands in 1765, as the colonialists preserved the administrative power of 
landed intermediaries to maximize revenue generation and solidify political control. The most powerful 
intermediaries were given the title of zamindar, and with the support of a network of lower level 
administrators, were given the right to collect tax and look after land administration. This included the 
descendants of the Darbhanga ruling family and their local level intermediaries who became the largest 
zamindars, with their estates estimated to be up to 4000 square miles as of the late 19th century and a 
large network of intermediaries (Rorabacher, 2016). The zamindars  and their administrators, took 
advantage of their political privileges to maximize the exploitation of the peasantry through rent, usury 
and bonded labour (Jha, 2003, Ram, 1997). The flow of tax to the colonial regime meanwhile represented 
an early articulation with capitalism whereby surplus would be shared between the feudal landlords and 
the British colonial state. 
On the Nepal side of the border, the centralized bureaucracies of the Sen and Gorkhali kingdoms set up a 
tax collection system based on the Mughal model, and encouraged migration from India to populate the 
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forest frontier (Regmi, 1978, Yadav, 1984).  Along with a similar caste composition and culture, the mode 
of production in both regions was arguably quite similar in the early colonial period, with the exception 
of a few yet to be subjugated mostly Adivasi regions on what was left of the Nepal Tarai forests to the 
north and east (see Sugden, 2013).   
At the base of the agrarian structure in both regions was a large class of middle and low caste labourers, 
tenants and marginal owner cultivators. At its apex was a politically powerful class of usually high caste7 
landlords and intermediaries who extracted surplus though rent, interest on loans and tax, with the latter 
being channelled to the bureaucracy, the Kathmandu nobility and the army (Regmi, 1976, Chaudhury, 
1964). Official records from 19th century Dhanusha (Regmi, 1982c), and Madhubani (Chaudhury, 1964) 
suggest that local intermediaries took advantage of administrative weaknesses to extract additional levies 
from the peasants for personal consumption, including unpaid corvée labour obligations or begari (Regmi, 
1982).  
Inequality was intensified in Nepal under the Rana regime, who installed a more efficient tax generation 
apparatus to maximise the diversion of agrarian revenue to Kathmandu to fund the increasingly 
conspicuous consumption of the ruling class. They also distributed tax free ‘land grants’ across the Tarai-
Madhesh to upper castes from the hills who were close to state power (Regmi, 1976). The latter emerged 
into some of the largest landlords in the Dhanusha region, alongside the lowland upper and middle castes. 
Oral histories in the study sites reported that the surplus appropriated by local landlords through rent and 
usury was, like their counterparts in the capital, invested in an extravagant lifestyle. Landlords in 
Dhanusha kept elephants as status symbols and for transport. While Regmi (1976) coined the term ‘state 
landlordism’ to describe the Rana era mode of production, it has most of the same hallmarks of ‘Indian’ 
feudalism described by Sharma (1992) above. Local level landlords would still corner a significant share of 
the surplus, yet unlike on the Indian side of the border where tax was now paid to the colonial state, a 
share of surplus went to a centralised feudal nobility, like in the Mughal Empire. 
Throughout Mithilanchal, a lack of off farm labour opportunities, combined with population pressure and 
poor harvests within the existing feudal agrarian structure meant the emergence of a surplus labour pool 
was present even in the early 20th century8.  Colonial era labour migration had been reportedly in some 
parts of the Eastern Gangetic Plains such as West Bihar (De-Haan, 2010) and some parts of the state were 
sources of recruitment of indentured labour for other parts of the empire (Brass, 1999). There may have 
been some movement from Mithilanchal, although the Gazetteer for Darbhanga district (which includes 
Madhubani), with reference to the 1920s, suggests otherwise9:  
“Agricultural base has not been compensated by the industries and minerals and the burden of dependents 
on self-supporting persons have terribly increased. Absorptive capacity in agriculture is limited and with 
diminished opportunities for migration, ‘unemployment’ and under-employment have considerably increased. 
                                                          
7 Although in Nepal it was common for middle castes or chieftains from tribal (adivasi) communities to also take up 
administrative rule if they had local political power. 
8 For example, in Darbhanga ,the district which includes present day Madhubani, the population rose from 
2,630,496, in 1801 to 4,413,027 in 1961 (Chaudhury, 1964, 41). 
9 What migration was present, particularly in West Bihar, was often not marked by an articulation of pre-capitalist 
and capitalist systems, but a complete break from the local feudal economy of the village as in the indentured 
labourers who migrated to other parts of the British empire during the 19th century. 
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As much as 38 per cent of the total population constitutes the mass of cultivating labourer who are landless 
and a major portion of this class is redundant to the requirement of rural economy. Further the seasonal 
character of activity in agriculture makes the situation worse in off seasons and with little opportunities 
avoidable elsewhere they remain economically inactive for a greater-part of the year” (Chaudhury, 1964, 
294). 
A similar surplus labour pool is likely to have been present over the border in Dhanusha, which was even 
more distant from market centres and sources of employment. The comprador Rana  rulers built an 
alliance with the British to protect Nepal’s territorial sovereignty, while the colonialists were given access 
to Nepal’s raw materials as well as to its captive market for European manufactured goods, with taxes on 
trade enriching the Kathmandu ruling elite (Blaikie et al., 2001). This impeded the development of 
domestic industry, and farmers in the lowlands had few alternative livelihood options, reinforcing ties of 
dependence with the landed classes. ‘Migration’ was reported in government directives from as early as 
the 19th century, but rather than being labour migration, this appeared to emerge from pauperized 
peasants ‘fleeing’ to find new lands in India to escape the unending exploitation from Rana era landlords 
(Regmi, 1982).  
The significance of land tax as a form of surplus appropriation had declined at the end of the colonial era 
in both Nepal (Regmi, 1976) and India (Habib, 2002) as it lost its value10 and the taxation on trade provided 
new sources of revenue for the state11. The primary surplus appropriators on the ground were now the 
landlords, who continued to exploit the peasantry through rent. These included the zamindars themselves 
with extensive personal holdings, as well as their intermediaries. While those with their own land 
effectively became independent peasants on these plots, they were not free from feudal exploitation. 
Many simultaneously rented land and they continued to labour for landlords (being paid in kind), with 
many still dependent upon high interest loans. Peasant farming by owner cultivators therefore, even if 
one was to consider it a ‘separate’ mode of production, was likely subordinate to a feudal mode of 
production which was dominant at a local level. 
There was also limited change in the land ownership structure. During the 1950s for example, 77 percent 
of the total agricultural holdings in Darbhanga (including Madhubani) were reported to be below 2 acres 
with only 8 per cent of the holdings above 5 acres. Only 40 per cent of the population owned land 
(Chaudhury, 1964). There was added pressure on a fragile agrarian economy due to population increases. 
This was paralleled by price rises, an increase in cash needs to pay for the consumables which were now 
available in gradually expanding markets, and the rising costs of cultural expenditures such as marriages 
(Chaudhury, 1964).  As the last of North Bihar and Nepal’s lowland jungles were protected or cleared by 
the 1960s, the cultivable area had reached the limits of expansion (Gaige, 1976, Chaudhury, 1964), 
meaning the forest frontier was no longer an outlet to counter land scarcity.  
In the 1950s and 60s, both Bihar and Nepal saw land reforms and an abolition of the now redundant 
agrarian tax collection hierarchy. Interventions such as the 1950 Bihar Land Reforms act and the 1964 
                                                          
10 On the estates of the Darbhanga Raj for example in the first three decades of the 20th century, revenue paid to 
the colonial regime was just 10%, with 15 – 20% being used for administration of the land, with the remainder for 
the ruling zamindars (Rorabacher, 2016). 
11 This includes for example, the taxation on imports and exports in Nepal in the early 20th century (Blaikie et al, 
2001). 
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Nepal Land Related Act respectively, culminated in directives to abolish the colonial and Rana era tax 
administration system, the regulate rents and impose ceilings on landholdings to allow for the 
redistribution of surplus land (Adhikari, 2006, Regmi, 1976, Rorabacher, 2016).  While there was some 
redistribution of holdings, the reforms failed to create real transformations in agrarian relations. In Nepal 
for example, only 3% of the cultivable area was estimated to have been redistributed as of 1972 (Regmi, 
1976). In both Bihar and Nepal, landlords were integrated into the state agencies implementing reforms 
and there was limited political commitment to change (Kishore, 2004, Sugden and Gurung, 2012b, Joshi 
and Mason, 2007, Rorabacher, 2016). Oral histories in the study communities note how landlords were 
easily able to avoid reforms and keep their estates using political connections, division amongst family 
members or deception. In Bihar, Rorabacher (2016) notes how the reforms primarily impacted larger 
zamindars such as the families associated with the Darbhanga Raj, and even then, the administrators of 
the larger zamindars retained considerable wealth, along with political and economic power at a village 
level. 
Early wage labour, industrial stagnation and persistence of feudal agrarian relations: 
1960s – 1970s 
The persistence of the feudal mode of production (with landlords as the main exploiting class) and 
population pressure was putting severe pressure on the fragile agrarian livelihoods of the marginal and 
tenant farmer majority by the 1950s and 60s. As argued extensively elsewhere through the 
conceptualisation of the ‘semi-colony’, the post-independence economy of India was characterised by an 
industrial sector lacking forward and backward linkages which was dependent on foreign capital for capital 
goods and technical resources (Ghosh, 1983a, Lin, 1980). This blocked the organic development of 
capitalist industry (Alavi, 1990, Ghosh, 1983b). Even within this ‘distorted’ industrial sector, economic 
activity converged in larger cities mostly in western India, far from the rural heartlands of the Gangetic 
plains. According to 1951 census of Darbhanga district (which includes today’s Madhubani), local industry 
supported only 2 per cent of the total population and only 4% of the population were engaged in ‘non-
agricultural’ employment, which likely includes some migrant labour. The few local factories were low 
value agro-processing and textile industries, and labour was often seasonal. The bureaucracy and private 
sector was dominated by upper castes in what was already one of India’s most peripheral states, and 
opportunities for upward mobility amongst mostly lower caste marginal and tenant farmers were limited 
(Rorabacher, 2016).  
Off farm employment was similarly dismal on the Nepal side of the border. Across Nepal, ‘capitalist’ 
activity was restricted to importing and distributing foreign goods, agricultural processing, and services 
(Blaikie et al., 2001)12. Even for the few industries, the ability to compete with imported goods was limited. 
Aside from a government run cigarette factory in Janakpur, there were no major industrial employers in 
Dhanusha, with Nepal’s modest industrial activity restricted to a few small pockets in larger Tarai towns 
(Regmi, 1977). Most off farm labour involved construction work or menial work in government offices 
(Blaikie et al., 2001). At the same time, the ethno-nationalist and monarchist Panchayat system between 
the 1960s and early 1990s consolidated the balance of economic and political power with Kathmandu and 
the Nepali speaking upper castes who dominated the bureaucracy (Gaige, 1970). The southern parts of 
                                                          
12 Unequal trade treaties signed with British India in 1923 and again to an independent India in 1950 gave an 
unrestricted market to Indian and foreign made goods in Nepal, resulting in a growing trade deficit in the second 
half of the 20th century (Blaikie et al., 2001) 
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the Tarai-Madhesh bordering Bihar where much of the population resided was further marginalised by 
the construction of an East-West highway which bypassed border cities such as Janakpur and the old trade 
routes. It shifted the gravity of lowland economic activity away from the Maithili heartland to a new 
development corridor along the foot of the hills to the north where Nepali speaking hill migrants were 
encouraged to settle (Rankin et al., 2017). The marginal and tenant farmers of Dhanusha were thus doubly 
excluded from the national mainstream on account of their ethnicity and the peripheralisation of their 
homeland, as well as the fact that most were from lower castes within their own Maithili speaking 
community. Many struggled to access citizenship papers and state services, while a Nepali language 
curriculum placed a constraint on the educational attainment of the younger generation (Gaige, 1970). 
Across Mithilanchal, the limited growth of industry, dearth of off farm employment or opportunities for 
upward mobility, combined with persisting inequalities, is likely to have increased the pressure for labour 
migration. While there is limited data from the region a survey from Madhubani, Purnea and Gopalganj 
districts notes that as of 1982/3, 27.69% of households had family members who had migrated (Karan, 
2003). One may have expected this to be higher, yet oral histories that were collected as part of this study 
in the case study communities suggested that feudal relations of production, including debt bondage to 
landlords, and ideological ties between land owners and tenants also played a role in restricting migration. 
For example, in Ekrahi of Dhanusha, elder respondents recalled the 1960s and 70s when several upper 
caste landlords held private holdings of up to 60 bighas (40ha). A jajamani (ritualized exchange between 
castes) system was in place, whereby tenants or labourers would work for free for these landlords, only 
to receive grains as payment during festivals. Poverty was extreme, and it was recalled how many 
households did not even have a fire to cook or utensils. If one wanted to go to Janakpur for some official 
work they had to borrow formal clothes from land owners. Similar stories were recalled in Rakuwari, 
Bhagwatipur and Korahiya of Madhubani. Elders recalled how several decades ago the marginal and 
tenant farmers were in perpetual debt to zamindars, often taking loans of grain, then repaying them at 
harvest with 1.5 times the borrowed amount plus an unpaid labour contribution.  
In this context, ideological and debt bondage reportedly restricted migration. Not only were these 
marginal and tenant farmers bound to work directly for landlords to repay consumption loans, they did 
not have cash to pay for the train fare and other associated migration costs. Oral histories also noted that 
with low levels of education, they had limited awareness of opportunities outside, and rarely even 
considered migration as an avenue to escape debt bondage.  
Expanding markets, agrarian stress, and internal feudal transformation 
The rise of labour migration from the 1980s – 2000s  
Around the late 1980s and 2000s articulations to the capitalist sector through labour migration increased 
significantly in Mithilanchal. For Madhubani, this was initially to the Punjab to work on commercial farms, 
and later to work in the expanding capitalist sector in cities following economic liberalisation. The study 
from Madhubani, Purnea and Gopalganj districts by Karan (2003) notes that the proportion of households 
with migrants increased from 27.69% to 48.63% between 1982/3 and 1999/2000.  
Similar increases in migration are evident in Dhanusha, although the location of migration and type of 
work is different, pointing to the role of the state in mediating the type of engagement in the capitalist 
labour market.  As of the 1981 census, there were 402,977 Nepalese household members classed as 
‘absentee’. This had increased more than fourfold to 1,921,494 by the 2011 census. In 1980, 93.1% of 
migration was to India (Khatiwada, 2014), following a similar migration pathway as farmers in Madhubani, 
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although from the 1990s onwards there was a shift in the pattern of migration towards overseas 
destinations such as the Gulf and Malaysia. By 2011, 90.1% of migration was to overseas destinations and 
just below 10% was to India (Khatiwada, 2014). As of the 2011 census 26.3% of households in the Eastern 
Tarai-Madhesh have an ‘absentee’ member either in India or overseas. 
The data from the study sites suggests far higher levels of labour migration than regional or national 
datasets. The 2013 survey (see Figure 2) notes how between 60% and 80% of households in Dhanusha 
and Madhubani have labour migrants and it has become a core component of household livelihoods. 
Many families have more than one migrant. To some extent migration takes place within all land 
ownership groups, although those from wealthier groups are more likely to engage in higher skilled work.  
In Madhubani, all migration was to Indian urban centres, although migration to the Gulf is not unheard of 
in other villages. Although many are working in factories, labour is mostly casual, low paid and unskilled, 
being dominated by work in low value sectors such as agro-processing. Others work on an even more 
casual basis in ancillary sectors of the urban capitalist economy such as construction or the service 
industry (e.g. as cleaners, cooks or drivers). The most menial seasonal migrant labour is the domain of 
landless households. 
Labour contract migration overseas to the Gulf and Malaysia is by far the most prominent in Dhanusha 
today, accounting for 94% of the migrants. This emerged from the 1990s as government policy in Nepal 
actively facilitated migration to overseas destinations (Graner and Gurung, 2003) as it sought an outlet to 
avert social unrest in a stagnant industrial sector13. The economies of the Gulf, which absorbs the majority 
of overseas migrants from Dhanusha, differ from traditional sectors of capitalist production, being 
petroleum based, and migrants take on menial jobs in the oil, service and construction sector. The profits 
from low wage migrants enrich the multinational companies engaged in these sectors, while also 
benefiting the states themselves who extract vast rents from oil (Chalcraft, 2010, Hanieh, 2010)14.  
A deeper understanding post-1980s labour migration: Changes to the forces and relations of 
production 
Ecological stress, monetisation and migration 
To better understand the processes mediating the engagement of the Mithilanchal peasantry in migrant 
labour, it is useful to review the changes within the feudal mode of production itself. Firstly, with regards 
to the ‘forces of production’, ecological and meteorological stress have affected yields and cropping 
patterns. There is a perception that the climate has become more unpredictable as shown elsewhere 
(Sugden et al., 2014).  Changes farmers have observed include an increase in extended dry spells and late 
monsoons, more frequent extreme precipitation events such as floods, greater winter chilling and 
increased summer temperatures. This has been acknowledged in the meteorological records from the 
region (Practical Action, 2009, Sharma, 2009). Production costs have increased as farmers seek to offset 
                                                          
13 At the same time, there was an increase in demand for labour from Gulf governments in the neo-liberal context 
of the early 90s and the aftermath of the Gulf war. They sought a cheap workforce on short term contracts who 
were culturally separated from citizens and non-aligned to the political fissures of the Arab World which 
threatened the ruling elites (Chalcraft, 2010, Hanieh, 2010). 
14 Maintaining a continued flow of low wage labourers, divided by nationality, ensure that the rents from oil for the 
tiny population of citizens, do not need to be shared (Chalcraft, 2010, Hanieh, 2010). At the same time, the 
continued stability and perpetuation of these regimes which benefit from super-exploitation of migrants benefits 
the global capitalist core, who are ensured a continued supply of oil and profits from multinational corporations. 
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the risk of drought through investment in groundwater irrigation, and some have even stopped cultivating 
certain dry season crops. The demand for cash to manage increased production costs and the need to 
purchase food to manage shortfalls has increased the need for an alternative income amongst land poor 
and tenant farmers (Sugden et al., 2014).  Figure 3 documents the coded qualitative responses during the 
2014 interviews, when respondents were asked to explain their family members’ migration decision 
making. Out of the 86 respondents, drought was raised by ten, and the need to cover agricultural input 
costs was raised by eleven.  
However, perhaps more significant than biophysical changes in encouraging the migration of workers are 
changes brought about by the expansion of capitalist markets, driving monetisation within the feudal 
mode of production. Of particular importance is the rising demand for cash, a process which has been 
long shown to drive out-migration and the creation of a labour force. Meillassoux (1981) and Rey (cf. 
Resch, 1992) for example, noted how colonialism had the capacity to ‘break’ the autonomy of the older 
economic formation and drive peasants in the labour force, by creating a demand for commodities, 
establishing infrastructure, and promoting commercial production, while forcefully establishing taxes so 
households required cash. Singh (2007) applied a similar model to understanding how adivasi 
communities in India begin to supply labour to the external economy. With regards to Mithilanchal, the 
situation is somewhat different given that it is not a major cash crop producing region and colonial era 
taxation took place via landlords. Circulation of cash amongst marginal and tenant farmers was relatively 
limited until the 1980s, with consumption loans and wages being given in grain. However, economic 
liberalisation and the expansion of markets since the late 1980s has accelerated the demand for cash, 
intensifying some of the engagements with capitalist labour markets which occurred in other regions 
during the colonial era.  
Firstly, not only were farmers depending more on agricultural inputs to increase yields in the context of a 
rising population and climate stress, the actual costs of these inputs (alongside consumables) have 
increased exponentially over the last two decades. For example, on the Nepal side of the border, the price 
for diesel increased by 352% between 1995/96 and 2009/10, both impacting the price of diesel pumping, 
fertiliser as well as the price of food and other basic commodities (Pant, 2011). Secondly, the expansion 
of markets for imported manufactured goods (aided by improved infrastructure and neoliberal 
restructuring) and mass media have driven an emergent culture of consumerism. Farmers reported that 
they increasingly prefer to purchase plastic utensils and household goods rather than depending on what 
is produced in traditional cottage industries and through the jajmani system. An earlier study from 
Dhanusha and Madhubani also pointed to a huge increase in the costs of dowry, weddings and cultural 
events (Sugden et al., 2014), a trend which is widespread across the region (Rankin, 2004, Rao, 2001). 
Added to this is the privatisation of education and healthcare, and the associated increase in expenditure. 
Interviews and focus groups invariably noted that in the context of rising expenditure, marginal farmers 
and landless households, once partially dependent on locally available labour for cash, are no longer able 
to subsist on previous wage rates and levels of employment, driving them to enter the migrant labour 
force. Figure 3 shows that high or increasing household expenditure is perceived as even more important 
than agricultural input costs in contributing to the decision to migrate in the 2014 interviews, and was 
raised by 23 respondents, with dowry or wedding expenses being raised by nine. Figure 4 highlights how 
basic expenditure on food, education and healthcare consumes a significant proportion of migrant 
remittances.   
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Perpetual indebtedness remains an important phenomenon in this changed economic context, as also 
observed in an India wide review by Kar (2018) with reference to the changes brought about by economic 
liberalisation. The drive to migrate was often linked to the need to repay past loans (see Figure 3). 48% of 
all households from the 2014 interviews who are landless or own less than 0.5ha cite loan repayment 
when asked about the decision to migrate, often to pay off consumption loans, as well as debts incurred 
for house construction or marriage.  When one looks at the estimated use of remittances by households 
over the last year in Figure 4, what is striking is that debt servicing is by far the highest expenditure for 
most farmers, and in Dhanusha it is double what is spent on food. This is because farmers need to take 
additional loans to facilitate migration in the first place given the predominance of overseas migration in 
Dhanusha, which incurs significant payments to middlemen. All but two households interviewed in 
Dhanusha had taken loans to meet migration costs. The loans taken for migration are normally around 
Rs150,000 ($1500), and migrants would spend the first few years of their employment paying it off, 
trapping households in perpetual cycles of debt.  While some farmers invested remittances ‘productively’ 
in agricultural inputs, only for those with more than 2ha did it exceed what was spent on food and debt 
servicing, and even then it represents just 16% of expenditure on average. 
The interconnected processes of agrarian stress, rising living costs, consumerism and debt were 
contributing to a larger cultural shift whereby youth’s aspirations were outside agriculture. The expansion 
of telecommunications such as social media, TV and radio has not only created a desire for ‘modern’ 
lifestyles and consumerism, as noted above, but has generated a strong aspirations amongst youth to 
leave agriculture and experience a particular vision of modernity, even if the lived realities of labour in 
urban centres or overseas diverge from perceptions prior to departure. When better off migrants bring 
back consumer goods during visits, this serves to further bolster the demand for others to follow suit. This 
shows that the decision to migrate is not be driven by simplistic economic drivers alone, as argued 
elsewhere (Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan, 2003, Shah, 2006). Nevertheless, these changes on a cultural 
level still take place within the larger political-economic context of expanding capitalist markets into a 
feudal economy under stress. The analysis of the internal shifts within the mode of production below, also 
point to the complex intersection between economic, political and cultural processes which mediate the 
outflow of migrant labour. 
Reduced economic and political authority of landlords alongside persisting inequality 
An important recent change which can shed further light on the rise in labour migration is a decline in the 
authority of the traditional landlord in some locales, in spite of persisting economic inequalities, a trend 
observed elsewhere the region (see for example review by Harris, 2013). Testimonies by farmers 
suggested that the new economic opportunities available to the younger generation of the landed elite in 
urban centres mean that the pressure to hold onto land has dropped. This was most common in 
Dhanusha, where sales of land were encouraged by political unrest and tenant struggles, and fear of land 
reforms after Nepal’s now stalled Maoist movement. The contraction of economic activity in the Mithila 
belt of the Tarai-Madhesh has also discouraged landlords from holding onto land for speculative purposes, 
as shown in other parts of the lowlands (Sugden, 2013). Added to this is the fragmentation of estates due 
to population growth and division amongst sons. The amount of land being controlled by single 
households is therefore declining. Table 2 shows a significant drop in the percentage of land being owned 
by households with more than 3ha between the 1981 and 2011 in Dhanusha, and Table 3 displays a similar 
drop in the case of the whole of Bihar between 1971 and 2003.   
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It is worth noting though that while landlords estates are smaller than in the past, many still retain 
considerable holdings. Table 3 shows that despite a fourfold decline in the percentage of the largest 
farmers with <2ha between 1971 and 2003 across Bihar state, there has been just a 1.7 times drop in the 
proportion of land owned by this group. This divergence suggests there is still considerable concentration 
of land. Oral testimonies collected from the research site also suggest that it was mostly larger farmers 
who benefitted from sales by landlords, and a primary difference today is that at the apex of the agrarian 
structure there are both large farmers and the traditional landlords. Some large farmers are middle castes 
such as the Yadav and Kushuwaha, who have bought land of the larger landlords who are selling off their 
estates.  In other cases these large farmers themselves descend from landlord families who have divided 
land amongst sons. There is limited evidence that the base of the agrarian structure composed of marginal 
land owners or landless households is shrinking. In fact, between 1971 and 2003 the Bihar data shows the 
percentage farmers with less than 1ha actually rose. Similarly, in Nepal, Table 2 shows that there has been 
only marginal change in the proportion of households owning less than 0.5ha of land since the 1980s, and 
The Nepal Living Standards Measurement Survey data from the East and Central Tarai-Madhesh (see 
Figure 5) shows that between 1995/6 and 2010/11, landlessness and the proportion of pure-tenants has 
increased. 
Table 4, which combines the three surveys which contributed to this study, offers an insight into these 
trends and the overall agrarian structure today in the study sites of Madhubani and Dhanusha. What is 
clear is that there is variation across the villages. In Bhagwatipur of Madhubani for example, only seven 
households (4%) own more than 2ha, with some landlords owning over 18ha. This small group owns more 
than half of the land. In nearby Bhupatti, the 8% with more than 2ha of land own a staggering 70% of the 
land, with single holdings as big as 16ha.  By contrast, in some of the surveyed communities such as Nanaur 
of Madhubani and Giddha of Dhanusha landlords have relatively less economic power, with the largest 
land owners owning just 19% and 12% of land respectively. The recent changes which have reduced 
landlord authority have taken place unevenly across the region due to the complex history and caste 
composition of each community, including past class struggles. 
Looking at the larger picture of all 10 villages though, it is clear that landlords and large farmers still retain 
considerable control over the means of production, even if ownership is more dispersed than the past. 
On average, the land owners with more than 2ha own more than a third of the land in spite of being just 
6% of the sample. When one includes the land owned by absentee landlords who had recently moved to 
urban centres, and thus were not included in any of the samples, concentration of land is likely to be 
significantly higher.   
Furthermore, regardless of changes in the landlord class, the base of the agrarian structure remains 
dominated by landless (31% on average) and very marginal producers (38% on average), with the vast 
majority being from lower and middle castes. This is even higher in the communities where larger 
landlords are more economically dominant, such as Bhagwatipur and Bhupatti, where 80% and 76% of 
the sample respectively are landless or own less than 0.5ha. The latter group who own <0.5ha of land are 
relatively better off, although holdings are by no means sufficient for households to even come close to 
meeting food needs, and most are therefore also dependent on landed classes and are subject to a range 
of different types of surplus appropriation (see Table 4). 
Surplus appropriation by landlords and larger farmers takes place primarily through sharecropping, 
whereby the landlords extract half the produce in-kind as rent, and farmers also have to cover all the input 
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costs themselves. The dominance of this form of surplus appropriation however, varies by village, even 
within the communities with the highest concentration of land. In Bhagwatipur, 86% of landless 
households and 60% owning <0.5ha take land on lease and 66% of the land is under tenancy, while in 
Bhupatti tenancy is slightly lower (40% of the land), with surplus being appropriated through direct labour 
for landlords as well as rent. Farm wages for labourers are low, and vary from $0.75 to $1.5 per day for 
the most menial transplantation and harvest work (as of 2015), while many are paid in kind, usually 5-6 
kilos of paddy per day or a share of the harvested crop, although cash wages were becoming more 
common at the time of writing.   
The landed classes also mobilise alternative mechanisms through which to appropriate surplus – most 
notably of which is usury, a phenomena which has risen in recent years alongside rising indebtedness and 
economic insecurity. According to the 2015 census survey, landless households in Bhagwatipur and 
Mahuyahi for example, had an average debt of $408 and those owning less than 0.5ha owed $501.  
Interest rates are extortionate. While two thirds reported interest rates of 36% per year, a quarter were 
being charged 60% with the remainder being charged 48%. In Dhanusha, indebtedness was even higher 
due to loans to fund overseas migration. The 2013  survey showed that landless households owe on 
average $1071 and those with less than 0.5ha owing $793.  
New sources of surplus for large farmers and landlords included renting out agricultural equipment such 
as pumpsets, which were becoming increasingly important to prevent crop failure at a time of climatic 
stress. Out of the 82 pump sets counted across both regions in the 2013 and 2014 surveys, only 12% 
belonged to the households with less than 0.5ha, and landless farmers own none. Landlords would charge 
an hourly rate far beyond the cost of diesel and pump maintenance (see Sugden, 2014). 
While the relations of production appear to have changed relatively little over the last two to three 
decades and there is still a powerful surplus appropriating landed class, the more dispersed ownership of 
land within this class alongside changes on a political and cultural-ideological level, means that 
dependence of land poor households on single landlords has declined. For example, with regards to usury, 
respondents in one village of Madhubani noted that in the past they would generally depend on their own 
landlords for loans, while today there were four lenders to choose from for large loans of more than 
$1000, and around twenty households who could give smaller loans of $200 or less. This is linked to the 
fact that the apex of the agrarian structure includes more large farmers as well as traditional landlords, 
not to mention the expansion of markets and the greater circulation of cash, which gives alternative 
opportunities for better off farmers to accumulate wealth. The interlinkage of landlordism, labour and 
money lending as described in Bhaduri’s (1973) seminal paper on semi-feudalism, is less common today, 
although forms of corvée labour where tenants do unpaid ‘obligatory’ work for landlords persist in some 
villages on the Nepal side of the border (Sugden, 2016). The jajmani system of trade between castes has 
also broken down with the expansion of capitalist commodity markets. Contracts, although still 
exploitative, have become more impersonal, with perhaps fewer of the ideological patron-client 
relationships to back them up. Farmers also reported in interviews that they are relatively more aware of 
their rights particularly after the Maoist movement in Nepal, and under Bihar’s populist OBC15 politics 
since the 1990s. 
                                                          
15 OBC refers to ‘other backward castes’ according to the official government classification, many of whom have 
become politically powerful in recent decades. 
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This brings us back to the question of migration, and the processes mediating engagement in the capitalist 
labour market. Aside from agrarian stress associated with monetisation and climatic change, the changes 
in the relationship between landlords and tenants are also significant.  The break in ties of economic 
(through debt) and cultural dependence (through jajmani) on single land owners was reported by farmers 
to be make it easier for them to engage in migrant labour. At the same time, with improved education 
and communications, farmers have more knowledge of opportunities outside. As noted above, three 
decades ago, the political and cultural as well as economic power held by landlords over tenants, 
discouraged them from leaving to find work outside. 
Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan’s (2003) study from West Bengal and Gujarat notes how labour migration 
itself is used as an opportunity for marginalised castes to contest local caste and class hierarchies. To some 
extent migration from Mithilanchal has served to further undermine the local authority of landlords on a 
cultural and political level (the same changes which supported rising migration), although whether this 
has undermined their economic authority is uncertain. 
This brings us to a remaining question as to whether the mode of production can still be considered 
‘feudal’ in character despite these changes? In Djurfeldt and Lindberg’s (1975) classic study from South 
India, it is noted that changes in class composition over time such as the reduced dominance of a single 
caste or individual, means that the political-ideological ‘superstructure’ plays a weaker role in shaping the 
relations of production, even if the latter remain entrenched. The authors follow Althusser’s concept of 
relative autonomy of superstructure, which shows that there is no ‘mechanistic’ causality connecting the 
two levels of social reality. Similarly in Mithilanchal, despite local changes on a cultural and political level, 
many of the characteristics of a feudal mode of production outlined above are still present.  
Land is still concentrated amongst a small, albeit diverse class of large farmers, landlords and money 
lenders at the apex of the agrarian structure, with surplus being appropriated, usually in kind through 
rent, labour and interest. A key question in characterising the mode of production regards how surplus by 
landlords and money lenders is used. In the first instance, a part share of the crop provided by tenants is 
taken to the local mill then consumed amongst the landlords’ extended family, including those living in 
urban areas. Sometimes it is sold for cash on the market, and in theory, this could be diverted into ‘proto-
capitalist’ activities including investment in improved inputs and mobilisation of wage labour. However, 
the evidence on the ground suggested that the money generated by rent (including interest on loans) is  
spent on consumer goods by the family. Landlords contribution to input costs is negligible16, and as noted 
above, equipment purchases are themselves often opportunities to generate additional ‘rents’ through 
hiring them out to poorer farmers rather than being used to maximise productivity on their own land. This 
echoes Carlson’s (2018) observation of non-capitalist forms of production in the Global South. When land 
ownership itself is not governed by the market logic (i.e. it is inherited as part of a feudal estate), owners 
can engage in the market through selling off the produce received as rent, but are not under competitive 
pressure to improve efficiency. In fact, several landlords and large farmers who were interviewed cited 
that they were less interested today in investing in improved inputs and hiring labourers directly in the 
context of higher input costs and climate stress, a profit squeeze for labour employing farmers also 
observed by Djurfeltd et al (2008) in Tamil Nadu. However, while in the latter study large landlords had 
                                                          
16 A parallel study which sampled neighbouring villages in the region showed that only 7% of land owners in 
Madhubani and half of those in Dhanusha had contributed to the costs of fertiliser for their sharecroppers, while 
none had contributed to irrigation or other input costs. 
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effectively left agriculture, in the context of this study it appeared more common for landlords to retain 
their holdings and give land out to tenants who would bear the risk.  Sharecropping in this context had 
reportedly increased in the few years, replacing direct labour, although there is no data yet to back this 
up.  
One may argue that cash from rent could be diverted into productive enterprises outside of agriculture. 
While collecting detailed information on landlord livelihoods was challenging, few of the landlords 
interviewed appeared to have extensive engagement in any ‘capitalist’ enterprises. Some derived most 
their income entirely from the rent they received off the land, while others had income derived from 
positions of political power in the village government or bureaucracy, as well as money from family 
members with salaried employment. To give an example, data collected on landlords’ annual income 
sources in two villages in Madhubani (accepting that not all income may have been declared) noted that 
crop and livestock sales including the selling off of crop shares, were by far the highest ($1016 on average). 
Income from business was $439, but this mostly derived from only one household. Many of the industrial 
ventures were the domain of non-agricultural communities such as the Marwari in the case of Nepal, 
often based in urban centres17. Remaining average income sources included income from family members 
with salaried employment such as government jobs ($278), pensions ($90), cash rents ($53), and rental of 
agricultural equipment ($30). 
Understanding the articulation of modes of production 
Having reviewed the historical trajectory of agrarian change in Mithilanchal, marked by the persistence of 
a feudal mode of production and rising articulations with capitalism – this section seeks to better 
understand the economic and political relationship between the capitalist and pre-capitalist. Thus far it 
has been shown, as asserted by Li (2010), that the processes driving the peasantry from Mithilanchal into 
capitalist labour markets is not directly linked to the processes of capital accumulation which profit 
through employing this labour – and thus it is very different from the narratives of accumulation by 
dispossession applied elsewhere in the region. As Li (2010, 67) notes, the pauperisation of the peasantry 
cannot be considered a ‘strategy’ of global capitalism.  In the study sites, the agrarian stress mediating 
the out-flow of labour is connected in part to expanding capitalist markets, most notably when one 
considers the rising costs of living, monetisation and associated cultural changes. However, this has 
limited direct connection to the process of capital accumulation in the vastly different sectors of the global 
capitalist economy where migrants find themselves, including the construction, manufacturing and 
tertiary industries of India, the petro-economies of the Persian Gulf18, or the plantations and factories of 
Malaysia. Furthermore, this conjuncture whereby agrarian stress translates into labour migration can only 
be understood in the context of changes within the feudal economy – namely the persisting surplus 
appropriation by landlords and money lenders which eats into households subsistence needs, combined 
with the changing relations between agrarian classes which have removed some of the barriers to labour 
mobility. In other words processes associated with both capitalist markets and feudal relations of 
                                                          
17 In the Nepal Tarai, the small ‘industrialist’ class is quite distinctive from the landowning class. The former have 
limited interest in agricultural land, mostly being from the highly mobile Marwari business community. The latter 
are linked to the historic tax collecting bureaucracy and continue to derive economic wealth from government 
service today (see Sugden and Gurung, 2012a). 
18 Hannieh (2016) provides an in depth analysis of the role of migrant labour in the generation of exceptional 
profits for ‘Gulf Capitalism’ in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
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production and circulation in the village mean that both agriculture under feudal conditions and labour 
migration have become a core component of household livelihoods.  
A key difference therefore between the migrants from Mithilanchal and the surplus labour force produced 
by dispossession, as described by Li (2010) and others (Habibi and Juliawan, 2018) is not only the 
paradoxical role of pre-capitalist agrarian relations in mediating the flow of labour to capitalism in the 
former, but the fact that there is limited ‘dispossession’ at all.  Migrants’ families remain engaged in 
agriculture – albeit in an increasingly precarious position. Tenants and marginal farmers, unable to subsist 
due to surplus appropriation through rent, debt, and menial farm labour, receive wages in the capitalist 
sector which only cover their immediate subsistence needs, and a small excess to send home as 
remittances.  This excess however, by no means covers the costs of labour reproduction.  In Madhubani 
and Dhanusha therefore, the production of grain staples off the land (including sharecropping), is a 
priority for all households even after the migration of a family member. In the 2014 interviews, 80% of 
respondents noted no reduction in cropping intensity since the migration of their family member, and 
demand for tenancy remains high. 28% of households had actually started renting additional land to meet 
their food security needs after their family members migrated19.  
This also demonstrates that in spite of the ‘disconnect’ between the process driving migration and the 
needs of capital, this labour force still generates exceptional profits for the diverse sectors of the capitalist 
economy where it is employed. Echoing Meillassoux and Wolpe, the capitalist enterprises in which 
migrants work both overseas and in urban centres, receive for free, the cost of feeding the unproductive 
labourers (children and retired family members), and the costs of the labourers’ sustenance while they 
are on leave or working the fields at home (in the case of seasonal migrants).  The labour arrangements 
for migrants from Mithilanchal ensure they remain ‘temporary’ and their families remain home. In 
overseas migrant destinations such as the Gulf or Malaysia, this is ensured through the provision of fixed 
term work permits and strict employment regulations (Chalcraft, 2010, Hanieh, 2010), akin to those 
documented by Meillsassoux (1981) with regards to African migrants in post-war Europe. In the case of 
migration to Indian cities, the low wages and casual nature of work ensures that migrants are obliged to 
maintain strong links to their home communities, as noted elsewhere (Breman, 2009, Harriss-White and 
Gooptu, 2009). In the 2013 survey for example, 47% of migrants from Madhubani were seasonal, 
returning during the monsoon paddy season. Breman (2009) refers to this movement as ‘labour 
circulation’ rather than migration – given their continued ties to the village. As he notes, “labour power, 
not the social unit of which it is part, is made mobile” (Breman, 2009, 6).  
The case study therefore supports the assertions of past work of Meillassoux, Wolpe and the French 
radical anthropologists on the role played by pre-capitalist modes of production in generating exceptional 
profits for capitalism. What is different in Mithilanchal is the added layer of complexity posed by the 
presence of simultaneous surplus appropriation by a pre-capitalist landlord and money lending class. A 
related question is therefore how ‘super-profits’ for capitalism are generated when a portion of the 
surplus is being extracted through rent and usury. For this dual exploitation to take place, there appears 
to have been a reduction in the families’ (including migrants) aggregate leisure time, akin to Marx’s 
‘extension of the working day’, observed under capitalism. Firstly, men appear to have increased their 
                                                          
19 This was both due to the selling of plots to fund migration, as well as the need for women to take land on rent to 
increase food security due to the sporadic nature of remittances. 
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contribution to the aggregate family labour time by working outside. Out of the 86 women interviewed in 
2014, only 20% of men were engaged in local wage labour prior to migration.  
Secondly, there has been a reduction of male labour in agriculture, and with limited change to the 
cropping intensity, the burden has been passed on to women – the so called ‘feminisation of agriculture’. 
Two thirds of women who were tenants or marginal farmers (<0.5ha) in the 2014 survey noted workload 
as the primary constraint to agriculture in the post-migration context. Furthermore, the survey revealed 
that 46% of men from women headed households had actually contributed regularly to reproductive work 
such as child care and fetching fuel prior to their migration, further increasing women’s workload when 
they left. It can thus be argued that labour in neither mode of production meets the subsistence and 
reproductive needs of marginal and tenant farmers alone. A portion of ‘necessary’ labour time20 is 
performed in the capitalist and pre-capitalist sector to cover cash and food needs respectively, and the 
surplus labour time is in-effect ‘shared’ between landlord-money lenders and capitalist employers (see 
also Sugden, 2013).  
Structural power, class interests and the trajectory of change 
This last section considers the longer term trajectory of change and the structures which tie the 
constitutive elements of this articulation of modes of production together, both at the scale of the 
overlapping social formations of Nepal and India as well as within the larger global capitalist economy. 
While there is a clear disconnect between the processes driving farmers into the diverse sectors of the 
capitalist economy and the generation of super-profits by capitalist employers, this does not mean that 
power is ‘fluid and dispersed’ as Glassman (2003) notes in his critique of the ‘poststructural’ Marxist 
position21. In other words, this paper would stop short of considering the multiple class relationships (e.g. 
between landlord and tenant or between migrant worker and capitalist employer), as independent 
unconnected mechanisms of surplus appropriation, (or ‘class processes’, as conceptualised by Gibson-
Graham and Resnick and Wolff). Likewise, the sharing of surplus between the capitalist and pre-capitalist 
mode of production cannot be considered purely coincidental. 
Read (2002), in his discussion of primitive accumulation in England, noted like Li (2010) and this paper, 
that the army of surplus labour generated by feudal enclosure was not directly connected to the process 
of emergent capitalism, yet the capitalism took advantage of the opportunity this generated. He draws 
upon Althusser’s concept of détournement whereby the effects of one process are seized to serve other 
often unrelated purposes – which in this case was the generation of a capitalist labour force. He notes 
                                                          
20 According to Marx (1974) in (Capital Vol 1, chapter 9) necessary labour time is the period of the working day 
whereby labourers produce enough for their own subsistence (e.g. food, clothes) and to reproduce their labour 
power (e.g. childcare, education). Anything in excess of this is surplus labour time. 
 
 
21 As Glassman (2003, 681) notes with regards to capitalism: “Capitalists do not just dominate workers as one 
group of persons dominating another. Rather, the ability of capitalists to collectively dominate workers—which is 
always contested and in need of re-creation—resides in their capacity to exploit workers through control over 
investment decisions upon which workers and others in society are dependent, a capacity that is inscribed in legal 
structures, customary practices, institutions of repressive force, and networks of social relations.” 
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importantly that the state and legal apparatus played an important role in organising and transforming 
the army of disenfranchised peasants and labourers to become compliant wage workers for capitalism, 
echoing Glassman (2003) who emphasizes that structural power can be exercised not just on an economic, 
but on a political or ideological level.  
To better understand the structural power which ties the seemingly unrelated flows of surplus between 
the Milthilanchal peasantry on the one hand, and disparate classes of capitalist employers and feudal 
landlords on the other, it is worth exploring whether there is a convergence (or divergence) of class 
interests which are at play when these two modes of production interact, and its political manifestation.  
With regards to migration from Mithilanchal, while diverse capitalist employers are drawing substantial 
profits from migrant labour, their interests are not necessarily in conflict with those of landed classes in 
the labour sending regions, and they could even be argued to align. If the migrant wages or levels of 
employment improved to the point that farmers would no longer depend on tenancy or loans, larger 
landlords would perhaps be compelled to lower rents, while employing more tenants as direct labourers 
(separating them from the land). One may expect intensification of production through capital investment 
so landlords and rich farmers could pay farm wages equivalent to what is available in the capitalist sector 
and extract relative surplus value22. However, in the five years of research, farmer testimonies reported 
no downward pressure on rents, and as noted above, capital investment is limited.  
In fact, the two modes of production supplement each other, as argued extensively in an earlier study 
(Sugden, 2013).  Feudal relations of production constrain marginal and tenant farmers from subsisting 
through agriculture. This drives them to simultaneously compete for work as migrants in the capitalist 
sector, particularly as they seek to repay loans and meet urgent cash needs. They are willing to receive 
migrant wages which do not (on their own) cover the entire cost of family subsistence and labour 
reproduction, supported by their continued ties to the land, benefitting capitalism. Meanwhile, levels of 
employment and wages in the capitalist sector remain at levels that ensure competition for tenancies and 
loans in migrants’ home communities do not drop with an influx of remittances, favouring landlords and 
money lenders.  
This convergence of interests can be considered neither an active ‘strategy’ of capital, nor a coincidental 
alignment of class interests. Instead this represents landlords and capitalist employers seizing an 
opportunity for surplus appropriation at a given historical juncture marked by the uneven development 
of capitalism within the South Asia. The remaining question is the degree to which state intervention 
facilities the active reproduction of this articulation.  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully analyse the crystallisation of class interests at a political 
level, it may be useful to revisit the concept of a ‘semi-colonial’ social formation. Chandra (1974), Sau 
(1975) and Gupta (1977) for example, asserted that while India was integrated into the global capitalist 
system, imperialism had impeded the organic development of domestic capitalism, and thus capitalist 
employment has not risen above a threshold whereby landlord power is undermined. This paves the way 
for an accommodation between historically divergent interests of landed elites who appropriate surplus 
from the peasantry, and a capitalist class (Lin, 1980), and the interests of both groups reproduced through 
the political apparatus of the state (Ghosh, 1988). Similar arguments were applied to Nepal by Blaikie et 
                                                          
22 This is akin Marx’s transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist ground rent (Marx, 1967, 751-771) 
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al (2001) and the then Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai (2003)23, where it was argued that the 
bureaucracy was oriented to serve comprador and landed interests as a direct legacy from the centralised 
state sanctioned feudalism of the Rana era. 
Much has changed in the economy of South Asia in subsequent years, and how the class interests of the 
bureaucracy and state apparatus have evolved requires more research. It is nevertheless, likely that neo-
liberal policies adopted by both states have reinforced rather than undermined both landed and 
comprador capitalist interests. Economic restructuring in both countries has allowed the domestic 
comprador bourgeoisie to intensify their profits through the expansion of markets for imported goods, 
further undermining local production while increasing expenditure of the poor (see also Sugden et al., 
2018). This in turn sustains a continued flow of low wage migrant labour to the capitalist sector. 
Meanwhile, farmers’ dependence on landlords is reinforced under neoliberal policies by the relatively 
limited growth in manufacturing jobs alongside a burgeoning service sector, and the shift towards 
increasingly casual employment, often in construction (Kar, 2018, Sugden, 2009). Aside from neoliberal 
restructuring, state policy in both Bihar and Nepal arguably continue to serve landed interest, most 
notably by the persistent failure to implement long promised land reforms (Rorabacher, 2016, Alden-Wily 
et al., 2008). The vested interests are all the more striking in Nepal, whereby the land reform agenda has 
been all but forgotten (Sugden et al., 2016), in spite of it being a key rallying cry of last decade’s People’s 
War and the recent integration of the former communists into the ruling government. 
It should be noted that the class alliances at play in the context of migrant labour overseas from the Nepal 
side of the border and their political manifestation are perhaps more complex. Once again, the acceptance 
of thousands of Nepali workers whose reproduction costs are covered by the pre-capitalist sector is an 
‘opportunity’ seized by the Gulf states, yet they have no role in actually driving labourers from agriculture 
or any direct stake in policies within Nepal which favour landed or comprador capitalist interests. This 
migration does nevertheless serve these elite interests within Nepal. It represents a safety valve in the 
context of a stagnant industrial sector and persistent concentration of land (Blaikie et al., 2001), while 
remittances themselves serve to bolster the import based comprador economy (Sugden et al., 2018). 
There is also the lucrative manpower sector which has strong political protection, whereby middlemen 
generate significant profit from fees charged to migrants (Taylor-Nicholson et al., 2014), another form of 
surplus appropriation worthy of further study in the future. 
Conclusion 
This paper has raised critical questions on how we understand the process of capitalist expansion into 
peripheral corners of the world economy. While Mithilanchal and the larger Eastern Gangetic Plains has 
emerged into an important labour pool for regional centres of capital accumulation in South Asia and the 
Arabian Peninsula, the supply of this labour is by no means part of a linear trajectory of subordination to 
an omnipotent global capitalism.   
The paper firstly notes how the economic processes driving the peasantry into the labour force are not 
directly connected to the process of capitalist accumulation in the diverse locales where labour is 
employed. Climatic stress and expanding capitalist markets are generating change within the feudal mode 
of production at the grassroots with falling returns, rising costs of living and shifting aspirations of younger 
                                                          
23 Although in the Nepal case, the comprador class is enriched through the country’s subordinate position to India 
as well as within the global capitalist system. 
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farmers. However, while the subsequent agrarian stress has contributed to an unprecedented rise in 
labour migration over the last three decades, recent internal shifts in the feudal agrarian relations have 
played a mediating role. These include a reconfiguration in the structure of the landlord-money lending 
class, localised class struggles, and disintegrating ties of bondage to landlords, set against the very limited 
change (on an economic level) in the patterns of feudal surplus appropriation at the grassroots. 
Sharecropping, labour for landlords, and usury continue to the push marginal and tenant farmer majority 
over a threshold beyond which they cannot subsist within agriculture alone. 
The paper secondly, asserts that in spite of the complex processes mediating migration, it still generates 
considerable profit for capitalism, while also benefitting pre-capitalist surplus appropriating classes. The 
resultant ‘sharing’ of surplus points to a complex pattern of agrarian transition, yet it would be wrong to 
dismiss these disparate axes of exploitation as unrelated or coincidental. There are evolving (albeit loose) 
class alliances at home which have served the interests of particular sectors within the domestic capitalist 
economy as well as pre-capitalist landlord/money lending classes, although the former is by no means 
‘functional’ to capitalism.  In the context of Nepal and India, the state likely plays some role in crystallizing 
these alliances, reviving debates over the concept of the ‘semi-colonial’ social formation whereby there 
is a convergence of interests between a comprador capitalist and landed elite, although migration 
overseas points to looser and more complex relationships between surplus appropriating classes. 
This paper highlights the continued utility of the Althusserian method to understand agrarian transition 
in the 21st century. This includes a recognition that multiple modes of production can – and still do – co-
exist, while acknowledging that transition and change take place through multifarious processes on an 
economic, political, ecological as well as cultural level which don’t connect in a simplistic manner. While 
many of the changes at the level of the superstructure (e.g. consumerism or reduced ideological power 
of landlords) are connected to larger structural economic processes, there is not a functional overlap. The 
radical anthropological tradition which is derived from the Althusser, allows one to espouse pre-ordained 
theories of capitalist expansion, and identify the distinctive character of given modes of production in 
time and space, their relationship with others and the class alliances which facilitate their reproduction. 
Finally, in an era of unprecedented global migration the paper serves to remind scholars and political 
activists of the growing importance of the migrant labour pool to global capitalism, particularly when one 
considers the exceptional profits which can be gained by migrants’ continued ties to their home 
communities. This echoes the division Fraser (2018) conceptualises between the dwindling population of 
‘citizen-workers’ of the core, and the ‘expropriable’ workers of the periphery. Nevertheless in seeking 
alliances and avenues for political struggle, one also needs to engage with and understand pre-capitalist 
modes of production, including the class alliances which shape their articulation with capitalism. These 
older economic formations represent important axes of exploitation in their own right, while also playing 
an important role in mediating the outflow of wage labour from peripheral locales of the world economy.  
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Labour migration, capitalist accumulation and feudal reproduction: A 
historical analysis from the Eastern Gangetic Plains 
Tables 
Table 1: No of interviews, focus groups and quantitative surveys carried out by district 
District 
2013 farmer 
interviews 
2013 Focus 
groups 
2013 quantitative 
surveys 
2014 women 
farmer 
interviews 
2014 survey 2015 census 
survey 
Dhanusha 20 4 133 44 199 NA 
Madhubani 20 4 171 42 200 852 
TOTAL 40 8 304 86 399 852 
 
 
Table 2: Land ownership structure in Dhanusha 1981 - 2011  
Year Dhanusha 
% land owned by 
households with >3 ha  
% households with 
land holdings <0.5 ha 
1981-2 41.65 54.35 
1991-2 37.67 43.78 
2001-2 27.77 50.40 
2010-11 14.02 46.18 
Source: Nepal National Sample Census of Agriculture, 1992 – 2011) 
Table 3: Land ownership structure in Bihar 1971 - 2003 
Year 
% 
households 
with <1ha 
% 
households 
with 1-2ha 
% 
households 
with >2ha 
% area 
owned by 
households 
with >2 ha 
2003 89.4 25.29 3.5 32.72 
1992 80.56 23.84 8.34 47.57 
1982 76.55 22.91 10.92 53.14 
1971-2 71.71 23.43 13.18 58.37 
Source: (NSSO, 2006) 
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Table 4: Per cent of sample, tenancy status and proportion of land owned by farmer land ownership 
category (not including absentee landlords) 
 
Source: 2013 surveyi, 2014 survey ii and 2015 iii census survey  
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Thadi Jijha i 16 15 0 30 50 9 25 35 22 13 10 20 15 0 49 
Ekrahi i 17 22 0 54 31 21 17 22 22 6 0 16 7 25 41 
Giddha ii 11 91 0 41 28 15 23 13 26 20 25 40 4 0 19 
Raghunathpur ii 31 74 0 27 33 12 16 13 19 19 11 36 6 0 33 
M
ad
h
u
b
an
i, 
In
d
ia
 
Bhagwatipur iii 33 82 0 47 60 19 14 48 22 3 33 8 4 0 51 
Mahuyahi iii 60 35 0 28 24 27 9 2 31 2 0 13 1 0 29 
Bhupatti i 45 32 0 31 21 9 10 17 9 6 0 11 8 0 70 
Rakuwari i 23 56 0 53 43 28 14 33 26 7 38 27 3 33 19 
Nanaur ii 39 51 0 38 32 21 7 14 12 14 7 55 2 50 12 
Korahiya ii 32 44 0 36 31 15 13 15 18 14 14 40 5 0 27 
Average 31 50 0 38 35 18 15 21 21 10 14 27 6 11 35 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Map of study sites 
 
 
 
Figure 2: % of households with labour migrants in Dhanusha and Madhubani (2013 survey) 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Bhupatti Rakuwari Thadi Jijha Ekrahi
landless <0.5ha 0.5-1ha 1-2ha >2ha
36 
 
Figure 3: Reported factors contributing to migration decision making (no of cases) in Madhubani and 
Dhanusha (2014 interviews) 
 
 
Figure 4: Average % allocation of remittances according to farmer land ownership category in 
Madhubani and Dhanusha (2014 interviews) 
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Figure 5: Change in % of tenancy and land ownership in East and Central Tarai of Nepal  
 
Source: Nepal National Living Standards Measurement Survey, 1995/6 – 2010/11. 
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